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Summary  findings
Pinto, Drebentsov, and Morozov analyze the links  hardening budget constraints) and medium-term
between Russia's disappointing growth performance in  macroeconomic stability (by reducing the size of
the second half of the 1990s, its costly and unsuccessful  subsidies).
stabilization, the macroeconomic meltdown of 1998, and  Getting the government out of the nonpayments
the spectacular rise of nonpayments.  system means settling all appropriately controlled
Nonpayments flourished in an environment of  budgetary expenditures  on time and in cash, and
fundamental inconsistency between a macroeconomic  eschewing spending arrears, thereby setting an example
policy geared at sharp disinflation and a microeconomic  for enterprises and laying the groundwork  for
policy of bailing enterprises out through soft budget  eliminating tax offsets at all levels of government, and
constraints.  insisting on cash tax payments.
Heavy untargeted implicit subsidies flowing through  To stop energy-related subsidies would require not
the nonpayments system (amounting to 10 percent of  only that the government pay its own energy bills on
GDP annually) have stifled growth, contributed to the  time and in cash, but also that the energy monopolies be
August 1998 meltdown through their impact on public  empowered to disconnect nonpaying clients. This will
debt, and have made at best a questionable contribution  enable the government to insist that the energy
to equity.  monopolies in turn  pay their own taxes in full and on
Dismantling this system must be a top priority, along  time.
with promoting enterprise restructuring and growth (by
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Harden  Budgets by Dismantling Nonpayments
by
Brian Pinto, Vladimir  Drebentsov  and Alexander  Morozov*
Economics  Unit, World Bank Office, MoscowIntroduction
Russia's  transition  after  1995 was  marked  by  three  main  features:  elusive growth; a
spectacular  rise in noncash settlements and arrears ("nonpayments");  and a massive macroeconomic
meltdown in August 1998.  The meltdown reversed what many regarded as one of the singular
achievements of the 1990s: stabilization. Twelve-month inflation fell rapidly over the three years
preceding the meltdown, attaining single-digit levels between February and August 1998, before
shooting back up to 84 percent by December. In spite of gloomy prognostications  on both recession
and  policy  reversal, economic performance has  been  surprisingly strong following  the  large
devaluation associated with the meltdown, which coincided with rising oil prices.  In contrast to
initial forecasts for 1999, which anticipated a decline of 7-10 percent, Russia has ended up with
positive growth estimated at 3.2 percent. Further, survey evidence shows a sharp drop in the use of
noncash settlements  by enterprises.
This paper develops conceptual and empirical links among the elusive growth of the 1990s,
the temporary nature of the stabilization,  the rise of nonpayments and the meltdown.  It thereby
contributes to a better understanding of how the Russian economy works, a pre-condition for any
debate on whether Russia is following the "right" strategy. This debate has been fueled not just by
the meltdown  -- which was manifested in a sharp devaluation  and a comprehensive  fiscal-BOP-debt-
banking crisis --  but also by the virtual absence of serious enterprise  restructuring and solid corporate
governance  in the aftermath of Russia's privatization  program.'  We do not get into the undoubtedly
important privatization issue.  Instead, we focus on a complementary  set of issues, highlighting  the
macroeconomic environment created by the government's drive to conquer inflation at seemingly
any cost, coupled with the  simultaneous  maintenance  of microeconomic  soft budget constraints for
enterprises, as crucial in defining the response  of managers - be they in state-owned  or private firms
-to the transition. This inconsistent  macro-micro  policy mix, namely,  rapid disinflation without  hard
budget constraints for enterprises, gave a huge boost to nonpayments  and public debt while hurting
stabilization  and the credibility of Russia's transition  strategy.
Our findings suggest that Russia does not need a fundamentally  different paradigm from that
followed in Central Europe; and further, that nonpayments has very much been  the product of
piecemeal, gradual reform.  Dismantling nonpayments, for which the present time is particularly
appropriate, will do two things: first, establish a stable foundation  for the resumption  of growth; and
second, by signaling the credible implementation  of reform, dramatically improve the investment
climate and unlock potential resources ranging from latent foreign direct investment to the possible
1 On the meltdown,  see Slay (1999), and Kharas,  Pinto and Ulatov (2000).  On privatization,  see, for example, Black,
Kraakman and Tarassova (1999).reversal of flight capital. Once this process is launched, it will facilitate  the more medium run tasks
of institutional  building, much the same as in Poland. 2
Definitions
We define nonpayments  to include: (i) arrears, or overdue accounts  payable, as well as (ii) all
forms of noncash settlement (NCS),  including  barter, the use of "veksels" (promissory  notes), and tax
offsets whereby government spending arrears and overdue tax payments are mutually canceled.
While arrears, or the failure to pay, constitute  nonpayment in the strict sense, the use of NCS is not
strictly nonpayment, only the use of a payment instrument other than cash rubles or bank transfers.
However, as will be seen below, the use of NCS has subsidies built into it for energy and tax
payments. Thus, while arrears mark a complete failure to pay, NCS is a partial failure to pay (or
"underpay"). The two are lumped together  to capture the notion of a subsidy under "nonpayments".
The  nonpayments system has  two  parts: (i) a  large volume of  rapidly growing arrears,
estimated at close to 40 percent of GDP at end-1998 compared to 15 percent at end-1994; and (ii)
growing use of non-monetary exchange, with economic transactions increasingly settled by NCS.
By the summer preceding the meltdown, cash collections by the infrastructure monopolies were as
low as 12-13 percent on domestic sales for Gazprom (gas monopoly) and RAO UES (electricity
monopoly), and about 30 percent for the railways.  By 1998, the share of noncash settlements in
enterprise sales had increased to 50-70 percent. Over the 1995 - mid 1998 disinflation, as much as
50 percent of spending by subnational governments was in noncash form, while money surrogates
and offsets averaged  over 20 percent for federal  government  non-interest  spending.  3
Table 1 presents data on the time evolution  of nonpayments  over 1994-98.
Table 1:  Nonpay  ments-  1994 to 1998
__________  1..  I__
ARREARS'  billion  rubles  90.4  238.9  514.4  756.1  1056.4
percent  of GDP  14.8  15.1  23.4  29.2  39.3
Of  which:
To suppliers  billion  rubles  56.4  122.3  245.9  344.7  475.1
percent  of GDP  9.2  7.7  11.2  13.3  17Z7
To the budget  and  EBFs'  bln rubles  19.3  75.0  203.4  316.6  439.0
percent  of GDP  3.2  4.7  9.2  12.2  16.4
Wage arrears  billion  rubles  4.7  13.6  34.7  39.7  77.0
percent  of GDP  0.8  0.9  1.6  1.5  2.9
NCS  / SALES  percent  17  22  35  42  50
a/ end  of period  overdue  payables  for 4 sectors:  industry,  agriculture,  transport  and  construction.
b/ Russian  Economic  Barometer.  See  also  Aukutsionek  (1998).
Cd  excludes  penalty  interest  and  fines.
2 For an alternative, incremental approach,  see Stiglitz and Ellerman (1999).
3The  term "enlarged  government"  is used to denote collectively  the federal  government (or center), the regional (or oblast)
governments,  the local (or raion or municipal)  governments  and the four primary social EBFs: the Pension Fund, the Social
Insurance Fund, the Employment  Fund and the Medical Insurance Fund. Budgets are correspondingly  defined.The paper is organized as follows: the next section sets out a heuristic, analytical framework. 4
This is followed by a  discussion of macroeconomic policy and its impact on nonpayments, an
estimation of the sum of explicit and  implicit subsidies to enterprises, the role of  the energy
monopolies in this process and a discussion of why enterprises  resorted to noncash settlements on
such a large scale. The final section concludes, identifying a minimum set of reforms to dismantle
nonpayments.
Analytical Framework
Subsidies  to Manufacturing  Enterprises
Nonpayments masks a system of large, implicit, untargeted subsidies to companies, diluting
incentives to restructure.  The subsidies have been financed by a combination of transfers from the
energy  monopolies and  the accumulation of public debt.  Why does the  government tolerate
nonpayments year-after-year?  The answer is that this is part and parcel of its strategy to keep
unviable enterprises  afloat, as will be discussed below.
The idea that the energy sector cross-subsidizes  manufacturing  is an integral part of the virtual
economy story of Gaddy and Ickes (1998 - Go.  Essentially, GI argue that noncash settlements
(NCS) by the manufacturing  sector for both taxes and energy conceal subsidies while also masking
negative value added in manufacturing. This occurs because NCS prices of manufactured  goods are
inflated above their true market price cash equivalents.  While this pretense prevents, or minimizes,
inter-enterprise and tax arrears, it leads to wage and budgetary (pension) arrears as wages and
pensions must be paid in cash, and cash equivalents are low because manufacturing companies
subtract value.  This imposes a cash constraint on them: they can pay either wages or taxes in cash,
but not both. A drive to increase cash taxes would worsen the wage arrears and vice versa. GI argue
that everyone accepts the pretense of positive value added in manufacturing "because they can use
the overpriced  output in barter with one another or to pay their own taxes".
However, this assertion begs three questions.  First, while the pretense may work well in a
one-shot game, it would be untenable in a repeated game. Can the manufacturing sector really trick
Gazprom, its workers and the government  year-after-year? This concern is reinforced by noting that
in the GI virtual economy, only the manufacturing sector gains.  Every one else loses: workers;
pensioners; government;  and Gazprom. So do future generations,  because of the waste of economic
resources and  the postponement of growth plus  a  higher debt  burden, as  the  1998 meltdown
4In  other  words,  it does  not contain  any closed-form  analytical  solutions.demonstrated. Third, there is no explanation for why the subsidies should assume a noncash form.
Why not use standard channels of directed credits, for example?
We extend the GI framework by incorporating  the strategy employed by energy monopolies to
also gain from the nonpayments  system. We demonstrate  that, through tax arrears and unpaid dues
to extra-budgetary  funds, the energy sector substantially  passes on the costs of the implicit transfers
to the general fiscal accounts. This means that the subsidies eventually  show up in the accumulation
of public debt.  Sometimes, this pass-through is explicit, as with the export tax breaks received by
Gazprom until early 1996, or with continuous growth in real terms of Gazprom's arrears to the
enlarged budget.  Another avenue is ever re-emerging  tax offsets, of which Gazprom is one of the
major beneficiaries. Further, the energy monopolies,  both Gazprom  and its counterpart  in electricity,
RAO UES,  have made a number of acquisitions by converting overdue receivables  into equity in
selected companies  - a policy, which has significant  monopoly  economic  costs for the country. 5
The question of why the subsidies assume a noncash form is closely tied to the government's
main macroeconomic  objective over 1995-98, which was to lower inflation as soon as possible by
fixing the exchange  rate and controlling  credit.
Hard Budget Constraints  and Growth
Empirical results obtained by Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (1996) make a crucial link between
stabilization and growth: "[...I  inflation falls substantially [...] as fiscal deficits are brought under
control. [  ...] after two years growth is positive. [...] reducing  high inflation is a precondition  for the
revival of growth." This work, which clearly underpinned the Russian economic agenda between
mid-1995 and the meltdown, views stabilization as a strictly macroeconomic phenomenon, with
enterprise reform interpreted largely as privatization.  However, the accumulated experience with
transition since 1990 makes two points about hard budget constraints  for enterprises:  6 (i) they are an
indispensable  microeconomic complement to macroeconomic  stabilization,  as documented here; (ii)
they are necessary for the enterprise restructuring  that supports the initial revival of growth, and for
the credibility of reforms.  7  Later, the manner in which Russia pursued stabilization (not by cutting
fiscal deficits) is discussed,  while the rest of this section dwells  on hard budget constraints.
5  For Gazprom,  ferrous  metallurgy  and petrochemicals  have  become  main  targets,  while  UES concentrates  on penetrating
non-ferrous  metallurgy.
6 This  term  was  coined  by  Professor  Janos  Kornai.  For  the  seminal  article,  see Komai  (1986).
7The  earliest published evidence on the efficacy of hard budgets  and competition  for transition economies is contained  in
Pinto, Belka and Krajewski (1993). This result has been confirmed  most recently  by a 3000-firm survey conducted by
EBRD and reported in Carlin, et al. (1999),  and discussed in Chapter 7 of the EBRD Transition Report, 1999.Poland, the most consistent  growth performer  in Central and Eastern Europe, resumed
growing in 1992  when its "transformational  recession"  ended.  8 But the big boom in domestic
investment  came  only in 1995,  and foreign  direct  investment  did not take  off until 1996  - in the sixth
year of growth.  The initial  growth  spurt  came from  using  existing  assets  more  efficiently  and from
re-allocating  these  under the pressure  of hard budget  constraints  and competition. 9 Although  new
start-ups,  or de novo private companies,  are given much of the credit for Poland's dynamism,
empirical  evidence  shows  that many  of these  start-ups  acquired  equipment  and machinery  from  state
enterprises  struggling  to adapt to a new set of relative  prices and demand  patterns. 10 The Polish
experience  shows  that only after  the direction  of economic  policies  is credibly  established  - and the
resumption  of growth  is a factor  determining  such  credibility  - do investors  commit  themselves  in a
big way.'
As best as one can reconstruct  events  in Poland,  enterprise  budgets  hardened  in the following
sequence  involving  progressive  elimination  of: (i) government  subsidies;  (ii) soft bank loans; (iii)
inter-enterprise  arrears;  (iv)  tax arrears. Each  of these  funding  sources  became  a new safety  valve  as
the previous  one was  shut off. A somewhat  ironic  feature  of the above  sequence  is that as subsidies
get  eliminated,  a bulge  in inter-enterprise  arrears,  i.e.,  nonpayments,  develops;  but this gets nipped  in
the bud and disappears  spontaneously  once it becomes  clear that the government  is not going to
intervene  through  netting  out exercises  or bailouts.  Creditor  enterprises  no longer  have  an incentive
to run up receivables  from  firms  whose  payment  capacity  is suspect,  as the government  is not going
to offer offsetting  compensation.
From a macroeconomic  point of view, growth  in Poland  resumed  in 1992 when moderate
inflation  was  achieved  - before  mass  privatization,  before  large  doses  of new investment,  and long
before  single-digit  inflation  was  reached." 2 In 1992,  the  rate of inflation  was 44 percent,  and Poland
took its time  attaining  single-digit  inflation,  which  it did so only  in 1998. However,  this  gradual  drop
in inflation  did not hurt the credibility  of macroeconomic  policies  because  it was evident to the
private  sector  that the political  will to implement  the necessary  macro  fiscal  reforms  and micro  hard
budget  constraints  existed.
8 For a discussion of transformational  recession see Kornai (1994).
9 See Buckberg  and Pinto (1997) for a discussion of Poland's growth dynamics.
10 See Belka et al. (1994).
O  of  course, growth also came from new service sectors, such as finance,  media, telecoms, etc., and from small businesses.
But the point is that the way existing state firms are treated crucially determines  the credibility  of the investment climate.
Poland refused to bail out even icons of Solidarity  such as the Gdansk shipyard and the Ursus tractor factory. Entry of new,
and expansion of efficient,  firms is crucially linked to exit of unviable firms.
12 On moderate inflation and growth, see Fischer et al. (1996)  for the transition  countries, and Bruno and Easterly (1995) for
market economies.Public Debt Dynamics and Nonpayments
The standard differential  equation for public debt can be written as follows:
(1)  d = pd - ndfs + (r - g)ed,
where d is the ratio of public debt to GDP, d is its time derivative; pd is the primary deficit/GDP
ratio, the primary deficit being defined as non-interest  expenditure minus revenues; ndfs is the ratio
of non-debt financing sources to GDP, such as seigniorage and privatization revenues; r is the real
interest rate on public debt; and g is the growth rate of real GDP.  There is no steady state solution
for d, and further it will be on an explosive path, so long d  is positive, for which a sufficient
condition is that both (pd-ndfs) be positive and r>g. This was the case for Russia in the 18 months
preceding the meltdown, a  situation considerably exacerbated by  nonpayments, as will be seen
below.
The primary  deficit, pd, and non-debt financing  sources, ndfs, may be written as:
pd = NIE -t
ndfs = m-1,
where NIE is non-interest  expenditure,  t is fiscal revenue, and mon is the proceeds from the inflation
tax (the ratio of base money to GDP, m, times the rate of inflation, i).  We ignore privatization
revenues,  as these have generally been insignificant,  or could be regarded as a constant.
The link with nonpayments may now be developed as follows.  In keeping with its desire to
stabilize rapidly, the government starts with an ex ante budget that looks reasonable in relation to
inflation targets; but planned revenues fall short  as the energy monopolies run  tax arrears  to
compensate for the implicit subsidies they channel to manufacturing  companies through arrears and
NCS.1 3 This is a fundamental link: the biggest implicit subsidy providers turn into the biggest tax
delinquents. Finding itself with a persistent revenue shortfall, i.e., with an ex post pd that is higher,
the government has the following choices: (i) print more money; (ii) run spending arrears; (iii) cut
NIE; or (iv) borrow more. Given the desire to stabilize rapidly,  we rule out (i).
13 For expositional clarity, one can WLOG  regard all revenues as coming from the energy monopolies alone.On spending  arrears,  there  are two  choices:  (a) arrears  in relation  to firms;  and/or  (b)  delays  in
wage,  pension  and other  "social"  payments.  Running  arrears  to firms  is unlikely  to be a net source  of
finance  because  firms  will  retaliate  by incurring  tax  arrears.  This also applies  to the inflation  erosion
of stocks  of budgetary  and tax arrears,  which  will tend  to offset  each  other. It is also likely  that on a
net basis, this source of financing  could  be negative  as budgetary  and tax arrears  get offset,  with
firms effectively  paying  their  taxes  in kind at inflated  prices. Arrears  on social  payments  have  high
and visible political costs associated  with them, and further, add to contingent  claims on the
government,  which may  have to be extinguished  either  by borrowing  or monetization.  This would
tend to push  up the real interest  rate on new borrowing.  Thus, arrears  as a net source  of financing
does not look promising. However,  the signaling  impact  is unambiguously  negative. Spending
arrears  legitimize  tax arrears  and eventually  lead to offsets  that increase  future  tax arrears  because
paying  taxes  via offsets  is cheaper  than  doing  so in cash.' 4
This leaves  only  two options:  cut  NIE  to offset  the  revenue  shortfall;  or borrow. If NIE  cannot
be reduced  enough  to offset the chronic  revenue  shortfalls,  pd and public debt grow. Hence,  the
ultimate  effect  of the  implicit  subsidies  is to push  up public  debt  and  r, the  real interest  rate:
r = r(d, real  devaluation  risk),
i.e.,  r goes  up as default  risk (measured  by total debt  burden  to GDP,  d) and real devaluation  risk go
up.1' Lastly,  g, the growth rate of real GDP,  depends  both upon r (negatively)  and hard budget
constraints  (positively):
g = g(r, hard budgets).
Macro-Micro  Links, And Meltdown
The macro policy  goal  starting  in mid-1995  was to stabilize  rapidly  as a prelude  to growth.
The government  attempted  to achieve  this by fixing  the exchange  rate and tightening  credit even
though  fiscal reforms  lagged  behind. This led to expenditure  arrears  and tax offsets,  and boosted
public  debt.
The micro  policy  goal was to maintain  a social safety  net by avoiding  enterprise  exit. The
curtailment  of explicit  budgetary  subsidies  for enterprises  during  the  initial  years  of reform  was more
than offset  by the subsequent  provision  of implicit  subsidies  channeled  largely  through  the energy
14 This  happens  because  offsets  amount  to in-kind  tax  payments  at inflated  prices  or partial  forgiveness  as part  of bargaining
between  government  and tax debtors.  See also  Aitken  (1999).
15  r is a weighted  average  of the  real  interest  rate  on domestic  debt  and on  foreign  debt,  the latter  including  the percentage
change  in the  real exchange  rate. See  KPU  (1999).sector and lax tax enforcement. 16 The energy monopolies in turn passed the related costs on to the
fiscal accounts, becoming the largest tax delinquents  as well as the biggest participants in tax offsets.
This led to the chronic shortfall in cash revenues witnessed over the 1995 - mid 1998 stabilization,
estimated at 2.5 percent of GDP per year.  The government  had to borrow more, pushing up r.  This
caused liquidity problems  for enterprises  that pushed them further towards NCS, while increasing  the
need for implicit subsidies and stifling growth.  This intensified the chronic shortfall in revenues,
thereby making even pd a positive function of r, adding to the explosiveness of d, which reached
default levels, precipitating  a macroeconomic  collapse." 7
Macroeconomic policy and Nonpayments
The government  attempted to stabilize by fixing the exchange rate, which was done in mid-
1995, and  controlling credit; but fiscal deficits were not commensurately reduced, so  net new
borrowing was large at the federal government level, as Table 2 shows.  This table captures the
single most striking feature of Russia's temporary stabilization,  namely, while fiscal deficits strayed
far from their targets, the original inflation targets negotiated with the IMF were largely adhered
to.1 8 Russia got embroiled in unpleasant monetarist arithmetic, replacing money printing with a
public debt time-bomb.1 9
Table  2: Macroeconomic  Performance  Over 1995-1998
Ye;arW  qp  12-Mnt  Inaion- (96  '!i;;  ai deililtG)  i%  ;'  1ncas  - ,;,-In.;X;
_  _____  ___  __  __  __  __  ___  ________________  Puli  Debt00i0000  0F0  0  0  0$  :
Orliginal  Progra  Actuat~lDorighilp1r*am  Afw$11
Target  ___f_C  Tar et  i  _A  D__X__S  __
1995 (SBA)  63  131  6.5  5.6  25
1996 (EFF96)  25  25  4.2  bl  7.9  r  31
1997 (EFF96)  9  11  3.2b/  7.3  c  25
1998 (EFF96)  6  84  2.2 bt  5,9 c/d/
'Deficit of the enlarged government  on a commitments  basis. "tBased  on higher nominal GDP projections.  dInclusive net
change in government  arrears. dlExcluding  overdue interest on GKO/OFZ.  e'Sum  of domestic and foreign borrowing.
Authors' estimates..
With taxes flagging and inadequate expenditure control, the federal government resorted to
arrears and monetary  surrogates in addition to borrowing. Various generations  of offset instruments
were devised to cancel mutual budgetary and tax arrears. These doubled from 10 percent of federal
government  revenues in 1995 to 20 percent or more in 1996 and 1997, as seen in Table 3. Together
with monetary surrogates, offsets accounted for over 20 percent of federal government non-interest
16 This argument applies more broadly, e.g., when oil companies are threatened  with a cutoff in access to the oil export
pipeline unless they continue  supplying nonpaying domestic  refineries.
7 As noted in KPU (2000),  the public debt to GDP ratio remained roughly constant  over 1995-97 in spite of pd>0 and
r>>g, because of large capital gains from real appreciation on the foreign currency component  of public debt.  However,  the
dynamics (including  the real appreciation)  were unsustainable,  pushing the public debt / GDP ratio from 49 percent at the
end of 1997 to 104 percent by end-1999, following  the August 1998  meltdown.
18  NB: The comparison  is with the original  program path negotiated in early 1996. Subsequently,  both inflation and deficit
targets were revised.
19  Sargent and Wallace (1981). In retrospect,  the desire to achieve single-digit  inflation was pursued with all the zeal of a
lexicographically  ordered policy preference.spending over 1995-97,  setting a bad example for enterprises  to follow, and giving them an incentive
to  deliberately run  up  tax arrears that could be settled with lower  cost through offsets (which
incorporated tax forgiveness through the use of inflated prices). This was a major factor legitimizing
tax arrears, and contributing  to the persistent  shortfall  of cash taxes over 1996-98.2o
Table 3:  Offsets in the Federal  Budget on Cash Basis (billion  of rubles)
Year  KNO  DM0  RMO  TF  Unidentified  Totail  TOWa  Share  of
offsets  revenu|  offsets  in
revenues,
__  __  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  percent
1994  9  _  9.0  81.7  11.0
1995  21.8  21.8  210.6  10.4
1996  30.9  23.9  2.7  57.5  287.6  20.0
1997  62.0  24.5  2.1  88.6  371.2  23.9
1998  19.0  21.8  1  40.8  320.8  12.7
Source:  MoF,  State  Tax  Service,  authors'  estimates.
An emergency tax commission, the VChK, chaired by the Prime Minister, was established in
October 1996 to combat tax evasion. It intensified its efforts towards the end of 1997, after the first
shock from the Asian crisis, which coincided with a tighter stance by the IFIs towards Russia
precisely on the tax collection question. 2'  However, the VChK never made a serious dent on taxes
and was allowed to lapse.  This has been interpreted as weak political will; but the insights here
suggest that  the VChK was a  non-starter because of a  tacit political bargain: the biggest tax
delinquents (oil, gas, electricity, railways)  head the list of implicit subsidy  providers.
The impact of the preceding macro policy stance on enterprises  was huge. The real exchange
rate had already appreciated by some 650 percent between the start of transition in 1992 and early
1994 ("first phase"). It then depreciated  by about 15 percent till mid-1995,  when coinciding  with the
start of stabilization symbolized by the fixing of the exchange rate through the corridor, it began
appreciating again, by some 60 percent between mid-1995 and July 1997, when it peaked ("second
phase").  While the first phase of real appreciation (1992-94) can be rationalized as equilibrium
price-level adjustment (planning era prices and wages adjusting to world levels), the second phase
coinciding with the 1995-97  disinflation hurt enterprises substantially. This can be inferred from the
tremendous re-bound enterprises have been enjoying in the wake of the real devaluation associated
with the meltdown: by end-1998, the real exchange rate had returned to its mid-1995 level, and
enterprise finances and performance  have substantially  improved. 22
20 The column headings in Table xx are acronyms  of various offset instruments. The table has a remarkable feature: most
of the off-diagonal  elements are zero, because as soon as one type of offset was scrapped under pressure  from the IFIs, a
new one was developed,  leading to a persistent  pattern of mutation!
21  A Fiscal Action Plan, also known as the Kudrin-Fischer  plan, was formulated in November  1997 to bring the deficit
under control. For the first time, expenditure control under the auspices of the federal treasury  received serious attention,
while the federal  government committed to eliminating  offsets by January 1, 1998.
22 Ahrend (1999) contains an interesting  analysis of the incentive effects  of the real exchange  rate.  See also OECD (2000).
It is also likely that with oil, gas and other commodity  exports enabling a surplus  on the trade balance, a much larger realReal interest rates averaged a massive 53 percent based on the one-year GKO (treasury bill)
from mid-1995 to mid-1997. No successful transition  country, and indeed, no normally functioning
market economy, has had to deal with such a prolonged spell of such high real interest rates.  When
growth resumed in Poland in 1992,  the real interest rate on one-year government  paper was close to
zero, and the real exchange rate was kept in check after  a phase of "equilibrium appreciation"
through a devaluation 17 months after reforms began and the shift to a more flexible exchange rate
regime a few months later.
The combination of high real interest rates and real appreciation from 1995- mid 1998 in
Russia pushed enterprises  towards nonpayments  as they sought to borrow from each other, workers,
the energy monopolies and the government;  and necessitated  ever higher implicit subsidies.
Subsidies to Enterprises and Debt Dynamics
Enterprises  received and continue to receive  subsidies from two sources: explicit, from various
levels of the government budget; and  implicit, from the budget and energy monopolies via the
nonpayments  system.  Given the inherently  opaque nature of this system, it is impossible  to uncover
the hidden subsidies exhaustively.  We present rough, but strongly illustrative, orders of magnitude
of these subsidies to the enterprise sector excluding energy companies, and thereby bring out the
pernicious impact on the primary deficit and debt dynamics.
Annex 1 contains a detailed estimate of the explicit and implicit subsidies to the real sector
from the  enlarged budget  (federal, regional and EBFs) and the  two main  energy monopolies,
Gazprom and RAO UES.  Important components of subsidy, such as ad hoc tax exemptions,  are not
included because of lack of information. We note first that the explicit subsidies are large, ranging
between 8 and 10 percent of GDP, except for 1998,  when they shrank to 6 percent. Second, implicit
subsidies are also exceptionally high. These have four components  - - (i) the net increase in tax and
EBF payment arrears (excluding penalties for late payment) and (ii) in arrears for energy payments;
(iii) tax offsets at off-market prices (we conservatively assume a price premium of 30 percent,
implying a 23 percent savings on the tax bill paid in kind), and (iv) NCS for energy (also at  a
premium  of 30 percent) - - and two sources-  the budget, and the energy sector, restricted in our study
to Gazprom  and RAO UES and their affiliates.
A simple decomposition of implicit subsidies for 1996 and 1997 (the two years for which
more complete data are available,  and during which most of the disinflation occurred) is now made,
appreciation occurred than would have otherwise been possible. No wonder then that Russia's BOP vulnerability  increased
sharply as oil prices began falling in 1997.based on the following  accounting. Let TO and TA denote implicit subsidies via tax offsets and tax
arrears (including  to EBFs), respectively;  and ISE, implicit energy  subsidies, i.e., subsidies to the real
sector provided by energy companies. Then:
Implicit subsidies to enterprises  excluding  energy companies  = TO + TA + (1  -a) * ISE,
where a is the fraction of the implicit subsidies channeled  through the energy companies,  but whose
cost is ultimately  born by the fiscal accounts when the energy companies do not pay their own taxes
and EBF contributions  in full, and engage in offsets (which  are incorporated  in TO and TA). Table 4
below summarizes  implicit subsidies based on Annex Table 1:
Table 4 : Implicit Subsidies, 1996-97
(% of GDP)
Year  1996  1997
TO  2.2  2.7
TA  5.5  4.7
7.7  7.4
ISE  4.2  3.2
Using the above formula,  implicit subsidies to the non-energy  enterprise  sector were 7.7-11.9  percent
of GDP in 1996 and 7.4-10.6  percent of GDP in 1997.
Effect on Public Debt
The impact of hidden subsidies on the federal government's debt can be gauged from the
change in tax arrears to the federal government  plus payment arrears to the EBFs (which become the
contingent and then actual liabilities of the federal government).23 This would capture subsidies
stemming from weak tax enforcement, as well as the pass-through of the implicit subsidy costs
incurred by the energy monopolies. This adds up to 4.9 percent of GDP in 1996,  and 3.6 percent of
GDP in  1997.  Interestingly, net new borrowing at the federal level as a  share of GDP was 7.5
percent in 1996, and 5.6 percent in 1997. In these two years, we recall from Table xx that the fiscal
deficit of the enlarged government exceeded the original target under the IMF program by 3.7 and
4.1 percent of GDP respectively.  Table 5 shows the deficit of the enlarged government when
adjusted for implicit subsidies.Table 5: Adjusted Budget  Deficit and State Debt, 1996-1998
Adjusted enlarged  budget deficit(+)/GDP  03  -. 1  -.
(percent)"at  0.3  -0.1  4.5
Net new public borrowing/GDP  76  57  1.
(percent)  b  7.6  i57  181
Implicit subsidies deducted.  Federal  government  borrowing only.
Source: Authors' estimates.
Energy Monopolies
The pricing, taxation and regulation of Russia's vast energy monopolies is not simply a fiscal
issue, it is an issue of economy-wide import. Hence,  transparency  is vital, but this is damaged  by the
nonpayments system in costly ways, as we shall see below.  As noted in the previous section,
enterprises received significant subsidies from the Gazprom, the gas monopoly, and RAO UES, its
counterpart in electricity.
Gazprom
The typical composition of Gazprom's cash sales is illustrated  by its results for 1997.
Table 6: Gazprom  Sales and Cash Collection  Ratio, 1997
Marke  :  Dellveries  Price  Sales  Carcis  s  rec./Sales
(bi"lion  m)  ($1000  c)  ($ iion)  (  miim  o%)
Europe  121  88.5  10,707  10,707  100
CIS  64  76.8  4,937  2,855  58
Domestic  301  47  11,536  1,730  15
T  tal  t  4860 0  20T067,180  n  15,292  56
Source:  Company  data,  Customs  Committee,  Brunswick  Warburg,  Morgan-Stanley  Dean  Witter  Research,  staff  calculations
From the table, one can calculate that even though domestic shipments exceeded 60 percent of total
gas deliveries in 1997, they accounted for only 42 percent of sales, and a mere 11 percent of total
cash receipts.  Table 7 shows that the average annual implicit subsidy passed on by Gazprom to
domestic customers as a  result of unrecoverable arrears and inflated NCS prices was about  1.5
percent of GDP per year over 1993-1997, a cumulative total of $26.2 billion. 24 Electric power
utilities  account for  approximately 50  percent of  Gazprom's overdue receivables, followed by
chemical  industry - 7 percent, and ferrous metallurgy  - 5 percent.
23 We do not include tax offsets as these do not have a direct debt impact (only through pre-emptive  tax arrears),  although
they constitute a subsidy and adversely affect the quality  of public spending.
24 Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov (2000).  Note that with regulated gas and electricity  prices, the energy monopolies  cannot
in turn inflate their prices for in-kind settlements.  Note further that gas prices in Russia are a fraction of those in central
Europe, where western prices apply.Table 7:  Domestic  Implicit Subsidy  Provided  by Gazprom
Via arxears  Via  barter  Total as % of GDP
($  billion)  ($ bilon)
1993  1.4  1.4  1.4
1994  1.6  1.7  1.3
1995  3.4  3.7  1.8
1996  3.6  3.7  1.8
1997  3.3  3.5  1.6
Total  12.7  13.5
Source:  staff  calculations
Power Utilities  - RAO UES (UES)
Like Gazprom, the electricity sector is heavily involved in the nonpayments web, and serves
as a  major channel for  large implicit subsidies to domestic industries.  Table 8 shows that the
electricity generation sector is also plagued by low collection rates and by low cash collections, i.e.,
by both arrears and NCS. These phenomena  are unique to FSU countries,  as a detailed multi-country
World Bank study of the energy sector shows. 25 The problem is virtually absent in the transition
countries of central Europe  and has been largely solved in the Baltic Republics.
Table 8: Composition  of Power Utilities Sales by Means of Payment*
199.  1997
Sales  100  100
Cash & liquid equivalent  20  20
Bank  bills  11  6
Offsets  and  barter  49  62
Unpaid  arrears  20  12
* Including intra  -industry transactions
Source:  UES,  MFK  Renaissance,  Brunswick  Warburg
Table 9 presents our estimate of the implicit subsidy flow from the electricity generation
sector.  According to it, the average annual net subsidy extended by power utilities to other sectors
amounted to 2.3 percent of GDP per year over 1993-1997, a cumulative total of $36.8 billion. 26
Consequently, the energy sector as a whole has been providing economy with an annual implicit
subsidy equal to 4 percent of GDP - a hefty $63 billion over the five years, 1993-1997.
25 World  Bank  (1999).
26 Net  power  utilities'  subsidy  excludes  share  of gross  subsidy  coming  from Gazprom.Table 3.5: Domestic Implicit  Subsidy  by the Electricity  Generation  Sector
Viaarrears  Vlabrt  0  Totalas% ofC0D
($ billio  (  billion)  ;t
1993  3.0  2.0  2.5
1994  3.9  2.8  2.6
1995  3.7  4.8  2.2
1996  3.5  5.9  2.4
1997  0.5  6.7  1.6
Total  14.6  22.2
Source:  staff calculations
Cazprom and RAO UES - Policy Issues
The first serious problem is that the implicit subsidies transmitted  via Gazprom  cloud its
"true" taxation rate, thereby strengthening its bargaining position in relation to the government.
Thus, Gray (1998, Appendix 3) argues that Gazprom's domestic tax compliance is only 40 percent,
so that it is under taxed.  Applying this compliance rate to the gas excise, VAT, Road Fund and
Social Fund mandatory contributions, the average tax rate would equal 17 percent of total sales.Z 7
But the situation changes dramatically when implicit subsidies are included.  Taking arrears to
Gazprom at 30 percent of sales, NCS share at 55 percent with a mark-up of 30 percent, and cash
sales at 15 percent, and noting that the marginal implicit tax rate on arrears is 100 percent, and on
NCS sales 23 percent, the effective tax rate works out to be:
0.3(1 + 0.17) + 0.55(0.23 + 0.17) + 0.15 x 0.17 = 0.597, or
60 percent, much higher than assumed by Gray.  The effective rate of 60 percent consists of an
explicit rate of 17 percent and an implicit rate of 43 percent, the latter flowing from arrears and the
NCS subsidy. 28 This rate is much higher than the 42.6 percent statutory rate (see footnote 27).  Of
course, the question of whether the statutory rate is high enough arises; but the implicit taxes cloud
the issue.  Therefore, eliminating nonpayments is a pre-condition for regularizing the taxation of
Gazprom.
Second, the taxation situation becomes even more murky when one considers that Gazprom
manages  to transmit a substantial, but unknown part, of the implicit subsidy to the public exchequer.
Client arrears have been more than offset by Gazprom's own arrears  to the budget, and, increasingly,
extra-budgetary funds.  Federal  and  regional  tax-offsets, which  typically  involve  some  tax
27 The statutory gas excise rate is 30 percent of producer  price, which translates  into 23.1 percent of sales.  The same
applies to other turnover taxes, translating VAT of 20 percent into 16.6  percent of sales,  and 3 percent of Road and Social
Fund contributions  into 2.9 percent, giving a total statutory  rate of 42.6 percent. Assuming  40 percent compliance,  we end
up with a 17 percent explicit rate (total tax actually paid/total sales including  arrears).
2' The assumed mark-up of 30 percent on NCS is probably  a minimum, as Gazprom's offer of 30 percent cash discounts
has not met with much response.forgiveness, have also  absorbed part of Gazprom's burden.  Further, between  1993 and  1995,
Gazprom was able to recover an additional 0.5 percent of GDP per year as a result of tax privileges
granted by the government on gas export sales.  The electricity monopoly has  negligible hard
currency exports, and has never enjoyed tax privileges similar to Gazprom. 29 As a result, the only
way it can offset implicit subsidies is by running arrears to the government  and to its fuel suppliers,
including importantly.  Gazprom,  which alone accounts  for 30 percent of power utilities' payables. In
spite of this, the sector was unable to pass on the burden of the implicit subsidy from arrears onto the
government prior to 1997.  In spite of large tax offsets run by the government for the electricity
generation sector on an annual basis,  power utilities had positive  net receivables  prior to 1997.
The costs do not end here.  Woodruff (1998) argues that when Gazprom settles sales with
NCS, it is in effect engaging in the same sort of discriminatory  pricing any monopolist  would, in this
case, charging domestic customers  less than foreigners; and further,  given low marginal costs, this is
justified on commercial and economic grounds.  However, Gazprom's price discrimination is not
without cost:  (i) it has multiple domestic prices, and by charging unviable domestic firms lower
prices than more efficient ones, the expansion of more efficient firms and economic growth get
impeded; 30 and (ii) Gazprom makes up for charging lower prices by converting nonpayments into
equity in  targeted firms and  industries, thereby (as noted earlier) creating monopolies in other
branches of industry.  In other words, there are significant negative externalities (in terms of
foregone growth and additional monopolistic  behavior) and fiscal costs associated  with the subsidies
transmitted  via the energy monopolies.
Why do  the electricity companies tolerate nonpayments?  In addition to the inability to
disconnect customers because of legal ambiguities  in the civil code and political pressure (see World
Bank (1999) and Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov (2000)), the electricity companies' central role in
many NCS schemes makes them vulnerable to influence  by numerous interest groups, who profiteer
on NCS intermediation. According to the Ministry of Interior, NCS with power utilities serves as a
focal point for Mafia money laundering, and provides huge potential for corruption in the form of
side payments to managers and bribes to public servants. Finally, NCS creates strong incentives  for
power utilities managers to get involved in profiteering and bribes. 31 Therefore, NCS and arrears
represent a soft budget constraint that also enables various interest groups, including power utility
managers, to  enrich themselves in  an atmosphere of tight liquidity constraints. This helps the
perpetuate the system.  World Bank (1999) reports instances where Energo managers refused cash
payments because  the resulting transparency  ruled out side payments.
29 Interestingly,  beginning  last year UES has embarked on an active export promotion  campaign, so far resulting in
agreements  to boost electricity  sales to Germany,  Japan and China.
WMcKinsey  Global Institute (1999)  describes this as "unequal competition",  and notes that it is endemic in the Russian
economy.
31  The Bank energy sector study points out that barter intermediaries  are often controlled  by the managers of Energos,
enabling them to skim off profits by inflating prices on the inputs side.This means that an unknown fraction of the subsidy targeted at ailing enterprises ends up in
pockets of managers, corrupt public officials and the Mafia.  The funds are mostly taken offshore,
either draining the resource base of this economy, or coming back under the guise of off-shore
investment  to legalize ownership.
Given their central position in the nonpayments  web and significant government ownership --
35  percent of Gazprom, 52.5 percent of RAO UES  -- Gazprom and  RAO UES are  obvious
instruments for the government  to dismantle  nonpayments. A key strategy being used is to insist on
a time table for increasing cash collections by the energy monopolies. The analysis here shows that
this will work  only if  the  EMs are permitted to  disconnect nonpayers, which  is now  legally
ambiguous under the existing Russian Civil Code; and if the government and all budget-funded
entities make their own energy payments on time and in cash. 32 The importance of a  credible
disconnection policy is shown by two remarkable  statistics: first, the railways have a much higher
share of cash sales than either gas or electricity because they are not legally obliged to serve
nonpaying civilian clients; second, casual observation shows that nuclear power stations have even
lower cash collection ratios that conventional  power stations. The reason: unlike conventional  power
stations, nuclear power stations cannot reduce the voltage without risking a crisis with the reactor.
Thus, their disconnection  threat is even less credible.
Enterprise  Behavior and NCS 33
According to the analytical framework and macro-micro policy links presented earlier: (i)
nonpayments (arrears and NCS) by enterprises would increase with high real interest rates and the
real appreciation of the ruble (as the trends in Table 1 showed); (ii) there would be a rising need for
enterprise bailouts and subsidies as part of implicit social protection policy (Tables 4 and A-1); and
(iii), public debt would grow to finance the subsidies, a tendency reinforced by (a) the low inflation
target and (b) attempts by the energy monopolies to pass on the costs of  the subsidies they transmit
by becoming "tax delinquents" (Tables 2 and 5).  A macroeconomic  crash would eventually result.
This can be summed up as follows:
Enterprise Nonpayments  = f (macroeconomic  stringency,  micro soft budgets).
In keeping with the above formalism and the systemic view of nonpayments presented here,
enterprise nonpayments has abated after the August 1998 meltdown.  This is largely due to the
32 See The World Bank (1999)  and Pinto, Drebentsov  and Morozov (2000).
33 For a historical,  evolutionary account of barter and other NCS in Russia, see Woodruff (1999). For an account of how
nonpayments over 1995-98  differs qualitatively and quantitatively  from that in the Soviet era, see OECD (2000).  See also
Ledeneva and Seabright (1998)."relaxation" in macro stringency as a result of the real devaluation,  which has led to an improvement
in enterprise liquidity. 34 Further, the government  has not been able to borrow commercially,  and has
reaffirmed its desire to stay the course (see Slay (1999) for an account of the government's behavior
post-meltdown - hyperinflation was avoided but although there  has  been no  reversal, further
implementation of reform has been on hold).  No new net government borrowing and  greater
pressure on the energy monopolies to pay taxes means a reduction in the ability to finance implicit
subsidies.  This push factor, combined with the pull of a large and sustained real devaluation, has
lowered NCS use, consistent with the analytical  framework  presented in this paper. 35
However, the nonpayments  system is not about to disband itself spontaneously. Thus, while
surveys by the Russian Economic  Barometer indicate that NCS as a share of sales in medium-sized
and small enterprises  has come down from 50 percent, it has stabilized at 35 percent for the last three
months of 1999.36  Similarly, arrears as a share of GDP have fallen at end-1999, but this is at least
partly, if not substantially, due to inflation erosion. Likewise, while Gazprom and RAO UES have
increased the share of cash in their sales, the level achieved as of the end of 1999 is still low by
central European standards -- 33 percent for Gazprom,  39 percent for RAO UES.  At the same time,
there has been no perceptible change in other factors that perpetuate nonpayments. One important
example is the politics of tax sharing between the subnational and federal governments, which is
such that the former may well encourage  noncash tax payments (part of NCS) to retain more taxes at
the local level. 37 Another critical factor (discussed  next) is the personal enrichment  enabled by a new
form of industrial  organization spawned by nonpayments. Thus, the core of the problem involving
the "government  -energy monopolies - enterprises" nexus remains.
The "New" Industrial Organization 38
An  opaque,  untargeted  system  of  subsidies such  as  the  one  embedded  in  Russia's
nonpayments system is a natural recipe for the creation of alliances aimed at personal enrichment.
Broadly speaking, these alliances involve the managers of subsidy receivers, subsidy providers and
government officials.  They collude to siphon out the implicit subsidies essentially by  creating
34  See  Ahrend  (1999)  for  the striking  impact  of the real  devaluation.  OECD  (2000)  discusses  this  and other  factors  that
have  improved  enterprise  finances.
35 Other  explanations  for  high  NCS  use  by enterprises  have  focused  on tax  evasion  (Hendley,  Ickes  and Ryterman  (1998)  -
HIR),  a banking  system  geared  to tax collection  (HIR,  see  also  Tompson  (1997)  ) and the inability  to lower  prices  because
of tax rules  combined  with  excessive  depreciation  charges  stemming  from  inflation  (Karpov  (1997),  Tompson  (1999)i
Woodruff  (1998)).  Commander  and  Mumssen  (1998)  highlight,  as a primary  factor,  the  liquidity  squeeze  and crowding  out
resulting  from  public  borrowing  and  high  treasury  bill yields. Commander  and Mumssen  (1998,  Table  4.2),  and
Aukutsionek  (1998)  present  evidence  casting  doubt  on tax evasion  as a primary  motive  for  NCS. For  a detailed  discussion,
see  Pinto,  Drebentsov  and Morozov  (2000).  See also  Volgin  (undated),  and  Buckberg  and Pinto  (1997).
36  In a seminar  held  on  January  28,  2000,  to discuss  Pinto,  Drebentsov  and  Morozov  (2000),  Petr Karpov,  author  of Karpov
(1997),  affirmed  that the  nonpayments  problem  has  not  diminished  significantly  in the largest  enterprises.
37See  World  Bank  (1999),  Kourliandskaya  (1999),  Treisman  (1999),  Shleifer  and  Treisman  (1999),  Chapter  VI.,  and OECD
(2000).
38 Numerous case studies illustrating  the points made here are contained  in Annex 3, Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov
(2000), based on a background paper by Pavel Kuznetsov.intermediaries that benefit from commissions  in arranging NCS, and which, by purchasing inputs or
concluding sales at arbitrary  prices, shift profits to the intermediary. The regional energy companies
are considered to be particularly adept at this (World Bank (1999), Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov
(2000)).  Further,  tax  offsets  and  procurement that  favors  certain  companies  also  provide
opportunities to cash-rich companies to pay taxes much more cheaply in kind.  Such alliances have
been  responsible for  the  spread  and  perpetuation of  the  nonpayments system  following  the
macroeconomic  shock.
To complicate the situation, government's tolerance towards tax offsets - one of the major
channels for transmitting implicit subsidy from public accounts to manager's pocket - stimulates
enterprises to accumulate arrears in anticipation of subsequent offset operations.  Moreover, some
evidence suggests that, while showing accumulation of inter-enterprise arrears  on  their books,
enterprises settle their transactions  offshore. 39 This further fuels spread of financial intermediaries,
with an increasing number established offshore.  Offshore intermediaries, belonging to Russian
financial-industrial groups  (FIGs - a  phenomenon unique to  Russia and  the  FSU among  the
European transition  countries), have become real accounting  units/treasuries  of enterprises,  providing
the latter with necessary cash component of working capital, and rescuing them in case of hostile
actions by the tax authorities. This has contributed to capital flight, which has reached substantial
levels. Moreover, being built on relative scarcity of cash and simultaneously  providing occasion for
huge personal gains, NCS has attracted the Mafia as a natural beneficiary  for laundering cash earned
in the shadow.  As a result, according to high ranking Ministry of Interior officers specializing in
combating organized economic crime, the mob is getting increasingly involved in the every day
business of Russian enterprises.
Another side effect of wide-spread NCS is proliferation  of vertically integrated conglomerates
impeding competition and new entrants.  Barter schemes, including multi-stage ones intermediated
by unregulated  promissory  notes, tend to embrace all stages of production cycle, facilitating  informal
vertical integration within FIGs.  Customers get firmly attached to existing suppliers (including
through managerial collusion  in  subsidy  redistribution), and  new  entrants  are  not  welcome.
Moreover, pricing policy of subsidized enterprises  undercuts any potential entrant not belonging to
an established NCS chain. 40 In fact, given that markets thick in NCS are by origin non-competitive,
pricing (not  just in nominal terms, but in relative terms, too) becomes highly discretionary. In many
instances,  prices do not show any definite pattern, and hence the system of market  signals corrodes.'
39 Bureau of Economic Analysis (1997).
40 Note, that while selling to the government and energy monopolies -- vehicles for implicit  subsidization - at inflated
p  rices, Russian enterprises  sell at much lower cash prices on the market.
41 This gives rise to different interpretations  of NCS prices, with some authors claiming that bartered goods are overpriced,
while others point at reasons for under pricing NCS relative to the cash market. We believe both arguments are correct
depending  upon circumstances  and purpose of a given transaction. In general,  while paying for energy or making  tax
payments  via NCS, inflated prices are the norm.Perhaps even more importantly, corruption fueled by huge gains earned on  NCS schemes and
implicit subsidy redistribution gets public servants glued into the same web of collusion, further
promoting  insider  deals  and  an  anti-competitive environment.  Thus,  corruption and  "crony
capitalism" have become typical of the new industrial organization  flourishing on NCS, obstructing
efficient resource allocation and growth.
Conclusions
Russia's 1995 - mid 1998 stabilization  did not lead to widely-anticipated  growth because low
inflation was achieved by fixing the exchange  rate, tightening  credit, public borrowing  and resorting
to money surrogates, arrears and various types of tax offsets in financing public spending - not by
cutting fiscal deficits and hardening enterprise budgets. 4"  As a result, the low inflation did not last
because public debt was placed on an unstable trajectory. While there is a tendency to attribute  the
August 1998 meltdown to a terms of trade shock (falling oil prices) combined with a global repricing
of risk flowing from the SE Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 (Slay (1999)), the analysis presented
here shows that these might have exacerbated  the situation, but were not a fundamental cause. The
fundamental cause has been the persistence  of soft budget constraints in the form of nonpayments,
which stifled enterprise restructuring  and growth, and eventually  jeopardized stabilization. To make
matters worse,  social protection via  subsidies embedded in  nonpayments may  also have  been
thwarted owing to the "new" industrial organization that siphons out the subsidies and enables the
personal enrichment  of managers and colluding  officials.
The incentives  embedded in nonpayments  and the personal enrichment  enabled have also had
a  deleterious impact  on  the  development of  vital  institutions.  Thus,  the  vested interests of
"authorized banks", which made vast sums of money by serving as fiscal agents, probably delayed
the creation of a strong federal treasury, thereby weakening expenditure control. 43 In addition, the
powerful banking lobby did not have much incentive to push for banking and related legislative
reform needed to underpin lending to the real sector, delaying the creation of a normal banking
system. Likewise, the tendency to tailor taxes to individual  companies has compromised  the formal
tax system and the credibility of tax enforcement.44
42 For example,  the Economist  Intelligence  Unit  Country  Report,  1  Q 1996,  page  7, forecast  GDP  growth  at 3 percent  for
1996  and 4 percent  for  1997. Eventual  outcomes  were  -3.4 percent  for 1996,  +0.7  percent  for  1997  and -4.9 percent  for
1999.
43 On  how  banks  accumulated  capital,  which  they  then  used  to acquire  prized  assets  during  the loans-for-shares  auction
phase  of privatization,  see  Black  et al. (1999).
4 Perhaps,  the heart  of the  matter  is Russia's  vast  endowment  of oil,  gas,  and  other  natural  resources  and how  to divide  the
spoils. Whether  resource  abundance  is a boon  or bane  has  long  been  debated  in the economics  literature,  with  resource-rich
countries  often  lagging  behind  in growth  and  leading  in corruption  (see,  for  example,  Sachs  and Warner,  1995).  Indeed,  the
energy  sector  has  played  a big  role  in Russia's  nonpayments  story,  and Russia's  rich  natural  resource  endowment  and how
to divide  the spoils  might  in future  years  be seen  as the  big  difference  between  Russia  and Central  Europe,  not 70  versus  40
years  of socialism.As noted above, while nonpayments  has abated following the meltdown, the problem has not
been solved, and its microeconomic core of soft budgets and a distorted industrial organization
geared at personal enrichment (which  defines present-day corporate governance in Russia) remain.
Further, even though the economy grew by  3.2 percent in  1999, a  rebound propelled by  the
devaluation and high oil prices, Russia is by no means on a sustainable  growth path. 45 Moreover, it
is extremely  unlikely that sustainable  growth in Russia will come in the first instance from large new
investments by domestic or foreign companies. Rather, borrowing  a leaf from Poland's book, initial
growth will have to come from using existing economic  assets and public finance resources better. 46
Budgetary  inefficiency, asset stripping and the large subsidies embedded in nonpayments  attest to the
huge potential for increased efficiency in Russia.  As in Poland, hard budgets would be needed to
extract this potential, which in Russia, means dismantling  nonpayments.
How to  dismantle the system?  A minimum set of  measures centers around getting the
government and  the energy monopolies out of  the nonpayments web  to  eliminate the  hidden
subsidies. Getting  the government  out essentially  requires that the government  make all its payments
on time and in cash, eschewing arrears to set an example for enterprises,  and completely eliminating
offsets; while simultaneously insisting on cash tax payments.  This needs to be combined with
continued reform to bring the enlarged fiscal deficit under control; a switch to budget execution
solely in cash form, and strictly avoiding further budgetary arrears; and tax reform, to enable the
smooth switch to transparent cash-based taxation. While the switch to a cash basis for the budget
might have a short-run inflationary impact, the medium-run fiscal consequences  will be positive
owing to the reduction in the size of subsidies and the enhanced credibility of tax enforcement in
relation to the erstwhile implicit subsidy  providers. 47
Two conditions need to be fulfilled in order to get the energy monopolies out and move their
pricing, taxation and regulation  to a transparent and efficient basis: (i) the government  must pay its
bills  on  time and  in  cash;  and  (ii) the  energy monopolies must be empowered to  disconnect
nonpayers.  Only  then will  the government's insistence on  cash tax  payments by  the energy
monopolies themselves, and higher cash collections  in their sales, be credible and enforceable.
4  The  economy  would  have  to  grow  by another  1.9  percent  in 2000  just to revert  to 1997  output  levels.  The  fragility  of the
1999  rebound  is underlined  by the IMF  Press  Statement  issued  on February  4,  2000:  "...progress  on the structural  reform
front  has been  limited  ...  . This  remains  a cause  for  concern  since  positive  macroeconomic  performance  cannot  be
sustained  without  further  significant  structural  reform  needed  to  transform  the Russian  economy."
46 Buckberg  and  Pinto (1997).
47 We believe the long-run strategic benefits of dismantling  nonpayments  and completing the transition will more than
outweigh any short-run inflation costs, which in any event can be minimized  by the insistence on cash tax payment. For
example, in Poland, the government was able to establish enterprise-level  hard budget constraints and embark upon a
program of fiscal reform while keeping inflation at moderate levels for a few years. This did not hurt the credibility  of
macroeconomic  policies or growth because it was evident to the private sector that the necessary  political will to implement
the needed fiscal reforms existed.The present time for dismantling  nonpayments  is exceptionally  good: the real devaluation has
given domestic industry a tremendous boost by discouraging  imports, improving their liquidity and
reducing the need for subsidies; the government  can no longer postpone difficult decisions because
access to commercial borrowing has dried up for the time being; and the lessons learned from the
meltdown are still fresh. The most important of these is that attainment of low inflation will lead to
sustainable growth  only  if  it  is  accompanied by  genuine  enterprise restructuring and  fiscal
adjustment. Both require the elimination  of nonpayments.
Shleifer and  Treisman (1999) note  the difficulty of implementing Russia's  vast reforms
agenda. This paper shows where to start the new millennium:  dismantle nonpayments,  replacing it if
needed with a much smaller targeted system of explicit subsidies that will not only have a clear
social impact, but also  promote growth (by hardening budget constraints) and macroeconomic
stability (by reducing the size of the subsidies).45  Once growth and  transparency revive, the
investment climate will rapidly improve, facilitating medium-run institutional building.  There is
ground for optimism, based on using existing economic  assets  and public finance resources  better.
4  McKinsey Global Institute (1999) found that 75 percent of assets  in firms surveyed by them as part of an analysis of 10
manufacturing  and service sectors in Russia could be utilized in the existing markets with minimal upgrading, suggesting
that the Polish strategy of first creating an environment  where existing assets can be used better may be feasible.Annex. Measurement  of Explicit and Implicit Subsidies
This Annex presents the methodology  for calculating explicit and implicit subsidies from
the budget and the two energy  monopolies: RAO Gazprom  and RAO UES.
Explicit budget subsidies to enterprise  sector (lines l.i and 1.ii in the Table A-1 below) are
taken directly from official MoF reports on federal and subnational  budget execution. Since most
of the budget expenditure category titled "national economy" represents input subsidies and
investment grants, this category was taken as a proxy for explicit subsidies.
Gross budget lending to enterprise sector also includes a subsidy component to the extent
of: (i) difference between market  interest rate and discounted  interest rate on budget lending; and
(ii) amount of overdue loans.  Measurement  of this component is problematic, especially at the
subnational  level, due to lack of data. Hence, this has been excluded  from our calculations.
We now discuss implicit subsidies.
In case of offsets, which are basically  swaps between  overdue receivables  and payables,
the subsidy component  is represented  by 30% overpricing  of procured goods and services in case
of the government. 4 9 Thus, for instance, entry "2.ii.a" in Table A-1 in 1996 is calculated  as:
Implicit  subsidy  = Offsets  amount*0.3/1.3=121.3*0.3/1.3  = Rb  28 bn.
Implicit  subsidy  as percent  of GDP  = Implicit  subsidy  / GDP  = 28/2200*100  = 1.3%.
The net increase in tax arrears to each of budgetary  level and EBFs (lines 2.i.b, 2.ii.b and
2.iii.b in Table A-1) is a difference  between outstanding  tax arrears at the end of period and of its
beginning. Fines and penalties are excluded.
Subsidies embedded in non-equivalent  barter 50 are evaluated  under the assumption that
prices of goods or other non-cash instrument  used to pay RAO Gazprom  and RAO UES in NCS
transactions  are inflated by 30%, while energy prices are not, because  the latter are fixed by the
energy commissions. Example: the entry "II.i.b" in Table A-1 in 1995 is calculated  as:
Implicit  subsidy  = Amount  of non-equivalent  barter*0.3/1.3  = 62.0*0.3/1.3  = Rb 14.3  bn.
Implicit  subsidy  as percent  of GDP  = Implicit  subsidy  / GDP  = 14.3/1585*100  = 0.9%.
The change in net inter-industry  receivables  of Gazprom (line II.i.a) is calculated as the
increase of stock of overdue unpaid deliveries  of gas to other industries  after barter and before tax
offset operations during each year of the period multiplied by the average annual domestic price
of gas deliveries: 51
Line  II.i.a. Change  in net inter-industry  receivables  of Gazprom  = change  in stock  of overdue
unpaid  gas  deliveries  to other  industries  after  barter  and before  tax offsets  * average  annual  domestic  gas
price.
Change  in net inter-industry  receivables  of Gazprom  as percent  of GDP  = Change  in net inter-
industry  receivables  of Gazprom  / GDP.
49 30%  is a sort  of average  overpricing  reported  in interviews  with  subnational  authorities.
50  Data  on RAO  Gazprom  and RAO  UES  are taken  from  companies'  financial  reports.
51 Gazprom's  own  overdue  payables  to other  industries  are negligible.Similarly, the change in net inter-industry  receivables  of RAO UES (line II.ii.a) is
calculated  as the increase of stock of overdue unpaid deliveries  of electricity  to other industries
after barter and before tax offset operations  during each year of the period multiplied by the
average annual domestic  price of electricity  deliveries. Mutual claims of Gazprom and RAO
UES are netted out: in line "II.ii.a" the change in net inter-industry  overdue receivables  of RAO
UES is adjusted  (reduced)  by the change in stock of overdue unpaid deliveries  of gas to RAO
UES after barter and offset operations  multiplied  by the average  annual domestic  price of gas
deliveries: 52
Line  II.ii.a. Change  in net inter-industry  receivables  of RAO  UES  = (change  in stock  of overdue
unpaid  electricity  deliveries  to other  industries  after  barter  and  before  tax offsets  * average  annual  domestic
electricity  price)  - (change  in  stock  of overdue  unpaid  gas  deliveries  to RAO  UES  after  barter  and  before
tax offsets  * average  annual  domestic  gas  price).
Change  in net inter-industry  receivables  of RAO  UES  as percent  of GDP  = Change  in net inter-
industry  receivables  of RAO  UES  / GDP.
52 RAO  UES' own  overdue  payables  to other  industries  (except  Gazprom)  are negligible.Table A-1. Explicit and Implicit  Subsidies Provided To Real Sector By Enlarged Budget and State Energy Monopolies,  Percent of GDP
Subsidy  types  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
1.Explicit  budget  subsidies  10.2  8.6  7.9  8.6  5.9
i.  Federal  3.0  2.5  1.7  1.8  0.7
ii.Subnational  7.2  6.1  6.2  6.8  5.2
iii.EBFs  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
2.lmplicit budget subsidies  0.7  3.2  7.6  7.4  10.4
i.  Federal  0.7  1.9  2.1  2.2  3.0
a.Offsets  0.7  0.6  0.8  0.8  0.4
b.Net increase  of tax arrears  n.a.  1.3  1.2  1.4  2.7
ii.Subnational  n.a.  1.2  1.9  3.0  3.1
a.Offsets  n.a.  n.a.  1.3  1.9  1.8
b.Net increase of tax arrears  n.a.  1.2  0.6  1.1  1.3
iii'EBFs  n.a.  n.a.  3.6  2.2  4.2
a.Offsets  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
b.Net increase of tax arrears  n.a.  n.a.  3.6  2.2  4.2
I Total  budget subsidies  10.9  11.8  15.5  16.0  16.3
I. Total implicit  subsidies from state monopolies  3.9  4.0  4.2  3.2  n.a.
i.Gazprom  1.3  1.8  1.8  1.6  n.a.
a.Change  in net inter-industry  receivables  0.6  0.9  0.9  0.8  n.a.
b.Subsidies  embedded  in non-equivalent  barter  0.7  0.9  0.9  0.8  n.a.
ii.RAO UES  2.6  2.2  2.4  1.6  n.a.
a.Change  in net inter-industry  receivables  1.5  1.0  0.9  0.1  n.a.
b.Subsidies  embedded  in non-equivalent  barter  1.1  1.2  1.5  1.5  n.a.
For reference:
GDP,  Rb bn  610.7  1,585.0  2,200.0  2,585.0  2,684.0
Notes.  1.Only  available  information  is summed  up in  totals
2. Budgetary  subsidies  are  calculated  on a gross  basis,  since  consistent  information  about  budgetary  arrears  is  not  available  (as  of end-97,  the  stock of budgetary  arrears  was  about  Rb  50
bn,  less  than  2 percent  of GDP).References
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